THE THEORY OF VALUE OF CHRISTIAN VON EHRENFELS Barry SMITH § 1. lntroduction §2. Foundations of a General Theory of Values §3. The Relation between Desire and Feeling §4. The Objects of Desire §5. On the Nature of Values §6. Types of Value §7. What Doth Charity Avail Me? §8. Interpersonal Value-Comparisons §9. The Struggle for Existencc among Values § 10. Value and Habit § 11. Conclusion § 1. lntroduction Ehrenfels' principal writings on value theory belong to the early period of his creative life. their publication following immediately upon that of his classic paper "Über 'Gestaltqualitäten"'. They are:1 - "Werttheorie und Ethik", a series of five articles published in 1893-94; - "Von der Wertdefinition zum Motivationsgesetze", published in the Archiv für systematische Philosophie in 1896; - "The Ethical Theory of Value", a revi!!W of Meinong's Psycho- logisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, published in the International Journal of Ethics in 1896; and: System der Werttheorie, vol. I: Al/gemeine Werttheorie, Psycho- logie des Begehrens (1897) and vol. II: Grundzüge einer Ethik (1898). All of these writings are now collected, with othcr, supplementary • 151 material, in vol. I of Reinhard Fabian's edition of Ehrenfels' Philosophische Schriften. I shall refer principally to the System der Werttheorie, citing page numbers according to the Fabian edition. What follows is intended as no more than an outline of Ehrenfels' views, with some reference to the relations between his work and the subjectivist approach to economic values initiated by Carl Menger in his Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre in 1871. All criticism will be spared, as also will detailed considerations of influence. 1 1 shall concentrate exclusively on value theory in the strict sense as Ehrenfels conceived it, avoiding conjecturcs as to the ways in which this theory rnight be supplemented by ideas from the theory of Gestalten to produce an account which would be more adequate to the dimension of aesthetic value.2 §2. Foundations of a General Theory of Values Menger founded what has since corne to be known as the "first" Austrian school of valuc theory. The first-generation members of this school included also Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser, with both of whom Ehrenfels had significant exchanges. 3 The school is today represented by. arnong others, F.A. von Hayek, Ludwig Lachmann and I.M. Kirzner, and passing mention will be rnade in§ 10 below of possible lines of comparison between Ehrenfels' thought and that of Hayek, in particular. Ehrenfels, on the other hand, together with Meinong and other pupils of Brentano. belonged to the "second" Austrian school of value theory: In contradistinction to the economists, the members of this school were concerned to develop a genera/ theory of values. They regarded economic value as only one special sort of human value. and urged that economic values could be properly undetstood only when their connection with the entire range of value-phenomena had been made clear. 1. For discussions of influences on Ehrenfels' value theory see Eaton, Grassl, 1982a, and Fabian-Simons. 2. The reader is however invited to cornpare the conception of value as organic unity set forth by Nozick in ch.5 of his 1981 with ideas sketched by Ehrenfels, e.g. in the fragment "Höhe und Reinheit der Gestalt" (1916). 3. Grass!, op.cit. is now the definitive survey of these exchanges. 4. See Eaton and, 011 the wider membership and influence of the schooi, Grassl, 1981 and (forthcoming). From: R. Fabian (ed.), Christian von Ehrenfels: Leben und Werk. Amsterdam: Rodopi, (l986), l50-l71l 1 5 2 The rnembers of th i s second school d id however look u p to the econom i st s a s hav ing ach ieved a theoret ica l depth a nd rigour i n the i r a na l yses wh ich was a t that t ime lack ing i n work on va l ues on the part of the ir fe l l ow ph i l osophers . Eth ics , in part icular, Ehrenfels concei ved as having ha rdly advanced beyond i t s beginn ings with the Greeks : i t se ts a s i t s goa l . . . an ex t ra neous and often a rb i t rary hst i ng :md rank ing of e t h ica l a nd other va l ue -objcc t s , from which one might a t best glean thost: fe..,..,ons in her i ted from past ages wh ich we ,*a l l "world l y wisdom" •*- somet h ing which we norma l ly learn t o unders tand 1 0 apprec ia te on ly when we have acqu i red i t for ou rsclves and a t our own cost (p . 2 1 4f. ). But how is t he desi red 1heore1ical understanding of va lues to be a ch ieved? Here Eh rcnf e l s tu rned on the one hand to t he task of generalising l aws of va l ua t 1on wh 1ch had been d iscovered by the econom i st c; . above a l l thc iaw of margi nal u t ih ty . And on the other band hc turned to psyd1ology . Th is he conceived . wi th some d i ffe rcnces, i n ihe wa y Bren tano conce i ved i t in the Psychologie vom empiriJchcn 5itandpunk t . Li! . as a descripr ive psychology of d i fferen t k i nds of ac t s and of i n terre la t ions be twel:"n acts . These two strands in Ehrenfrls ' work and i ndecd i n the work of �'h:i nong, whe> mus r be c red itcd wi th h a vi ng taken the fi rs t s teps m th i s d i n:-ct iotL support eac: h o ther mu t ua l l y : t h e sa me laws ho ld for moral va iues as for econormc va l ues because thc two sor!.S of values have the same p.syrhological foundations. §3 . The Rela t ion bet ween Des i re a nd Fee l i ng Ehienf els' psychological founda t ion of va iue-theory conceives the va lue of th i ngs as dependent upon human val u i ng act s , which a re in t u rn wncei ved as being dcpendent upon acts of desi re . Thus, at least i n fi rst approximat ion , 5. The most impor ta n t d i ffe rence , from our present poi n t of view, is the sha rp d i st inct ion d rawn by Eh renfe l s between the two categories offeeling and desire. These were run together by Bren tano into t he single ca tegory of 'phenomena of love a nd ha te ' . Brentano is c rit icised on th is poin t also by Anscombe in her 1 978. l t is t he common indebtedness to a Brentanian act- psychology which , more tha n anyth ing e ise . makes i t appropriate to regard Ehrenfel s . Meinong , K raus , K reibig and others as members of a single school . • 1 5 3 we do no t des i re thi ngs beca use we grnsp in t h em some myst icaL i ncomprehens ible essence "va iue" ; ra ther , we a scribe "val ue" to th ings beca use we desi re them (p . 2 1 9 ). Of cou rse the i mmedia te suspic ion awakened by a view of th i s k ind i s t ha t , i n spite of the detour t h rough des ire . i t must amount to some form of hedon i sm , i .e . to the view tha t the value of an object is u l t imate l y a ma t t e r of the pleasure (f ee i i ng) it wil l bring. But Eh renfe ls is not a hedon i s t : h e does not hold that one's own fee! ings const i tme the u ! t ima te goa l of a l l des i r ing . To see why not , it i s necessary to mention briefl y h i s account of the re la t ionsh ip between desi re a nd presenta t ion . Desi re is d i rccted towards some des ired objec;t ( the word 'objec t ' , hcre , bei np: understood in the widest poss ib le sense , to includr a l so prnperties , re la t ions , prncesscs , etc . ) . And th i s desi red object , according ro Ehrenfe ! s , rnust be presented i n some wa y by he who des ires i t . Seme 1dea of i t mus t be presen t a s a const i t uen t of the act of des i re . The question ol hedon i sm amounts , t herefore . to t he quest ion whether , when we des i r-: , we a lso necessa r i - l y present to ourse lves ou r own pkasure or our own pai n , or the remova l of the same . And the a nswer to this quest 1on is that i n many cases we do . bu t not in a/J. This is the ca se fi rst of a l l beca use : i n t h e most common c i rc umstances of ou r everyday l ife ou r dcs ir ing goes d i rec t l y ro ce rt a i n rout ine external tasks such as ea t i ng . drink ing, wai t ing , s i t t i ng , sieepi ng . e tc . , w 1 thout therc bci ng presented thereby t he s ta te of fee l i ng which corresponds to these tasks (p .236) a poi n t wh ich a n t ic i pates the importan t role played by habit i n Eh renfe l s ' theory, to be d i scussed in § 10 below. And i t i s the case , secondly , because some desires re late to periods of t ime of wh ich the subject wi l l not or could not have experience , or to the f eel i ngs of i nd i vidua l s wi th whom he cou!d have no con• cei vab le contact . I m igh t , for example , desi re that my remote descenda nts shou ld have the opportun i ty to acquire a taste for oysters: or I m igh t wish that the Spanish Inquis i t ion had never ta ken place ; a nd a range of other cases can be brough t forward to demonstrate tha t the concept of an act which i s d irected towards goa ls other than one's own feel ings does not conta i n any sort of con t radiction .6 6. Complement.a ry a rguments to t he same effect a re to be found i n Duncker, 1 94 1 . 1 54 Wh i ls t t he des i ring subject does not i n every case desire h i s own happi ness , there is of course some re lat ion between desi re and ha ppmess or. more genera l l y , between des i re and feeling. But this re la t ion is a complex one, involving both the dispositions of the given individua l a nd the relat ive promotion of ha ppiness which he expe- riences as being associa ted wit h given acts . We can say, very roughly, that the disposi t ion to desi re on the part of a g iven indi vidual i s dependent upon the d 1 sposi t 10ns of that i nd i vidua l to have certa i n feeli ngs. To say more than t h is . we have to recogn i se tha t ac t s of desi re , according to Ehrenfets, a re d ivided i n to three categories of wish ing , str i vi ng, and w i l l i ng . These th ree ca te- gori es a re ordered by the i n tensi t y of t he experienced tendency i n each to e xe rt a causa l infl uence on the surround ings of the subj�c t i n such a wa y a s to bri ng abouc the desired object . The y a re rela ted aiso i n such a wa y tha t , j ust as every desire incorpora tes a presen tation of the desi red object , so every strivi ng incorpora tes a wishing and every w i l l ing i ncorporates a striving (p .367f; sec also Ehrenfels , 1 887). 7 In re lat ion to the la t ter pai r , now, the re holds what Eh renfels cal ls the /aw of the relative promotion of happine.u ! Gesetz der relativen Glücksförderung] : Eve ry a-: t of s t riv ing or wi l l i n!! , a i the t ime a t which i t ta kes place , fu rthers the state of happi ness (of the desi ri ng subject] in comparison wi t h that s ta te whi<.: h would have obta i ned in the case of t he abscnce of t he gi ven act (p . 2 39 ) . Or more preci se ly : Every ac t of des i ring i s condit ioned . bo th i n i ts goa l a nd in i ts mtensity, by the rela t i ve promotion of happiness which i t brings in the l ight of the fee l ing-<füposit ions of the ind ividua l in quest ion at i t s time of entry into t he consciousness of this individual and du ring the time it remains there in (p .245) . Th is (relat ive) increase i n happiness is of course not i tself some- th i ng which is aimed at: th i s would bring us back to a form of hedonism , Rather. the law e xpresses one aspect of a compiex relation of dependence i n vo lving di sposi tional propert ies of an ind ividual , in something l i ke the way in which the law of marginal ut i l i ty , which 7 . I n Brentano's termino iogy, a presentation is an inseparable part of every desire , a wishing is an inse parable pa rt of every st rivi ng, and so on. Cf. Mu l l igan/Sm i t h . 1 985 . 1 5 5 a sserts that the re is a tendency fo r the u t i l i t y deri ved frnm a good to decrease with an increase in its supp ly , e xpresses one aspect of a complex re lat ion of dependence i nvolvi ng the <lisposi tiona l prope r� ties of a good to yie ld u t i l ity. Note , too , that i t would be unreasonable to assert any law of absolute i ncrease in happiness . One might , for exampie , do con- t i n uous bat t le against an evi l (for exampie i l l-hea l th) , which is neverthe iess cont i nuai l y worseni ng , and st i l l be a lways relatively happier than one would otherwise have been . It i s necessary, for given acts of s tri ving a nd wi l l i ng to take place, only that, should one have been condem ned to absta i n from them , one would have been st i l l more unhappy . §4, ll1e Objects of Desi re The propos i t ion tha t we a sc: ribe va l ue to th i ngs because wc des i re them was , we said , a fi rs t approxima t ion . For there a re th i ngs to wh ich we a sc ribe value wi thout our be i ng able to desi re them . Thus for e xa m ple I ca nnot desi re the possession of a materiai good which I a l ready possess , yet I can perfec t l y wel ! ascribe value to this good . Si m i la rl y . I cannot des : re that I be al i ve , and yet I place a va lue on my being i n th is state , Ehrenfe l s expresses this point in a way which is a t fir s t paradoxica i . He sa ys tha t i t i s on ly of th ings which do not exist that we can say that they have va lue a t al l . Of other things we have to say strictl y speaking that they would have va lue if they did not exist (p .252). A better approximation to a 'law of value' is then : We ascribe val ue to those th i ngs which we either in fac t desire , or which we would desire if we were not convinced of thei r existence . The va l ue of a th ing i s its desi rabi l i ty . . . The st ronger we desi re or would desire an object , the higher val ue does that object possess for us (p.253). Some of the a i r of paradox i s removed from such formulations when Eh renfels points out tha t , whi lst there is , certainly, a way of speak ing according to which we desire material things, processes, states (e.g. states of m ind) , and even relat ionships and possibilities, our desi ri ngs and valuings never relate d i rectly to the object , but a lways to its existence or non-existence (or, more generally, to our owning or losing it, to our being i n or lacking control of i t , to our consuming or fa i l ing to consume i t , and so on , i .e , to what, in the jargon , i s cal led a Sachverhalt or stare of affairs): r.* ... . . .. " *' 1 56 To des i re a n object is to dcsi re e i ther the exis tence of the th ing or i ts possessi on . a nd then i n the lat ter case the desire a lso re lates to an e x i ,tence . not of thc th ing i t sc lf, bu t of our power of d i spos ing over l t , a nd a i the �ame t ime i t is d i rected to a non-existence : the absencc of a l l d i s t urbam:es wh i ch wou!d inh ib i t t h i � power of d i sposa l . S im i l a rly we des i re ! he exis tence or non *-ex i s tence , or more pa r t i cu larl y the occurrence or non -occurrence , of certa in changes of place , processes, or sta tes , . . . ! p . 254 ) . Note tha t 'e x is tence ' , here , i s not a n abstract not ion, as i t i s , for e xa mple , i n t he ontology of Meinong. ( Ehrenfe l s ' problems are not a bs t racL bu t pe rha ps the most concrete t ha t there a re . ) For he ins ists t ha t the presen ta t ion of ex is tence o r non-ex i s tence wh ich i s invo!ved m an ac t of desi re a lways re la tes in some wa y to ex i s tence with in t h c ca usa l o rder to which the subject cxperiences h imse !f a l so a s be- long.mg . The re i s no spec ia l psychic basic-ekmen t * *ctesi r111g * * (w , sh ing . sr.ri 1; ing, wi ! i ini ) . Wha t wc ca ! i dcsir i ng i s a l ways noth i ng o t lie r than ihc presenta- t ion . foundm,I! a n: la t i ve promo t 1 cn of happmess , of t lw mcl usion or exc! us1 0n of an objrct rn or fn�m the causa l nc• 1work a round thc ctnt rt' of the prcsen t .:•• r: . :re1e ;-prc,en ta t :on ( p . 3R6) . We cm now �,ec: i h a t t he rema rk t ha t w i sh ing , s t r i vi n g a nd wi ! ! i ng rtpresen i d iffe rent orders of e xpe r ie nced causa l i nvolveme n t of t h e de smng s ;.1bwct a ppl ie '; , more prec ise l y , t o the ways i n wh i ch t he s�i bJCct 's own an ion:-. a n.' pn:sen ted by h im as a s soci a ted wi th t bi s p resen t a t ion of a n mc ius ion o r exc ius ion of the ob.1ec t of des i rc wi t h i n th 1 s causa l ne twork .. Th 1 s assoc ia r ion i s most a t tenua ted i n the case of t lw w i sh , yet even here t hc re is some residua l causa l 1nvolvernen t : however h igh ly w t m igh t va ! ue 1 he repl ica t ion o f events o f a g iven sort , we do no t w 1 sh tha t s uch even ! s shou ld t ake pla<.:e i n para l le l un i verses wi lh which we could have no possible ca usai contact .8 Tha l t he object of des ire is a lwa ys presented as set ca usa l ly i n rela t i on to t h e surrounding rea l i ty o f t h e subject i s c lea r where the objcct of desi re is a fu t u re s tate of the seif (an effect of what he h imself w i l l do). But Eh renfels i n sis ts that even i n rcgard to far dis tan t past or fu ture t i mes, for example if I dcsire t ha t Socra tes had been acqui t ted , or t ha t Beethoven had heard his 9th Symphony. then I ß. �t is _cons\derations such as thi s , perhaps , wh ich would e xplain thepccuhar a1r of unrca\\ty wh ich surrnunds the d ream-machine experiments•��cn of by Robert No1.ick in his 1 974 . 1 57 present these processes as brought i nto causa l connection with thi ngs, proccsses and events wh ich I regard as reaL I cGns1der the g1ven processes a lways either as co-determ in ing ca uses of presen t rea l i t ies in which I , wo . a m involved (a� in the two g iven cases.) o r as effccts o f shared causes , o r a s poss ib le sha rcd causes of fu t ure effects. a l l unders tood a s rda ted t o rn y present surrounding rea i i ty ( in bezug ,rnf die gegenwärtige subjektive Wirklichkeit! (p . 266). This moment of ca usal involvernen t i s retlecm.l in the way i n wh 1ch de:-. i r e ha� a rea l 'muscu lar ' effrct on one 's body, the way i n which object!> of des1 n' , as soon as we des i re them , 'cease to fioat a ro und as ::rni nsubstant ia l p !ay of l ight a nd shadow in the region of phantasy -- and wi n , a s i t were , embodie<lness a nd weight ' {p . 366). § 5 . On the Nat ure of Va! ues Ehrenfe l s d i smisses out of hand anempts , such as the Marxi a n l abour theory , to a n s wer t he q uest ion a s t o the nawre o f va l ue b y appea l t o not iuns i ikc cost o r sacnfice . Ccrta in iy l may dcc1dc prac t i ca ! l y wh Kh of two objeus i:,, mor<" va l uable to me by askmg mysel f for which objec i i would be prcpared to make thc greater -;a�r i fice ( oav the b igher p ricc ) . Bur th is , a s Eh renfels poin t s out . i s noth mg n�o;e tha n a usl!fu l pract ica l exped ien t. l t has no theoretica l consequences: it couid neve r hclp to rhrow ! i�ht on the content of the concept of value , s i !'lce of co11 rse it consists just in measuring one va l ue aga inst another, more specifica ! ly i n measuring a posi t i ve agains l a negat ive value (p. 267) . The trad ition of Austrian phi losophy to which Ehrenfels belonged sough t not to reduce one sort of object to another, but rather to describe as faithfully as poss ible ou r experiences of given objects and to describe the in terconnections between them i n such a way as to a llow these descri ptions to t h row ligh t on quest ions as to the i r nature a nd mode of cx istence . In regard to va ! ues . Eh renfels points out that t hey cannot be propert ies , disposi t ions or capac i t ies of object s , for t hen thei r ex i s tence would be bound up with the existence of the ob jects involved . S uch a conception would imply , for instance , tha t t h� val ue of the v ic tory of the Normans i n 1 066 , for exampl e for present-day Frenchmen , ceased to exist i n l 066. Value 1s , ra the r , 1 58 accord ing to Ehrenfe l s , a certai n smt of intentional relation between a subject and an object . lt is an i n tent ional rela t ion beca use i tsobta in ing does not depend upon the s imultaneous existence of thetwo rela ta . In th is respect i t is comparable to the reia t ion betweenpresenta t ion and presented object , or between judgment and objectjudged abou t , but it i s cornpa rable a lso to re la t ions such as s imi lari tyand d i fference .9 And a l l of t hese re la t ions , Eh renfe ls a rgues , can beawa rded a k i nd of ' supe rtem poral ex i s tence' (p .26 1 ) . 1 0 The re la t ion of va lue consis ts i n the fact that ' the subject e i theract ua l l y desi res the object or would desi re i t were hc not con v inced ofits e xi s t ence ' {loc . c i t . ) . Th i s re l a tion exists whereve r the most i n tu i t i ve, v iv id a nd complele presenta t ion of theex i stence of the givcn object condi t ions in the subject a state which liesh igher on the feel i ng-sca le plcasure-displeasure than t he correspondi ngpresen ta t ion of mat ters g iven the non-exi stence of t hc objecL Thcmagni t ude of t he va l ue i s proport i onal to the in tensi t y of the desire, asa lso t o the dis ta nce between the two feel i ng-sta tes so characte rised( locc i t . l . Th us va l ue is *subjec t i ve ' in the two-fold sense that i t depends for itsex i s tence on a spec ific v a l u i ng subject and for i t s i nterna l const i tut ion(i n t ensi t y a nd d i rectedness) upon the d i sposit ions of that s ubJect . I ti s , however , 'e rroneous ly object i fied by ianguage ' (p . 3 1 ) . Value is not ,be i t noted , he reby reduced to disposi tions to feel ing . For va l ue is not an a u tomai lc reflect ion of fee l i ng-d1spositions , as if we couJd read offthe va lue a th ing wou ld ha ve for each given subject from a k nowledgeof the way that subject is d isposed to feel . Value rela tes to feeli nga lwa ys t h rough the media t ion of desire , and thi s in troduces anelement of vol un tarism in to the accoun t . The presence of this elementreflects the fact t ha t . a t least in certa in circumstances , des ire mustcome i n advance of assoc ia ted feel ing , and this in turn has grea tsignifica nce for Ehrenfels' conception of the motor of human evolu•t ion , which he seems to conceive a s a spec ies of excess energy ofdesi re . 9 . Th e confusion, o r at least the terminologica l running together ofin ten tional and formal rela t ions is characterist ic of early Brentanians,inc luding Husserl . IO . On relational theories of value i n genera l see Ingarden , 1 984 . � \ . 1 59 §6. Types of Val ues [ may desire something eiiher for its own sake , or beca use of theeffects which I conceive i t as having in bringing about somethingwh ich I desire for its own sake. This yields for Ehrenfeis a division into intrinsic values [Eigenwerte] and ejfect values ( Wirkungswerte} . 1 1 On the other hand , a n object may have intrinsic value for me onlyin vi r tue of the val ue of some part or rnoment . Eh renfels gives thee xample of the in tri nsic value of a man in virtue of his goodcharacter. The va lue of the good character Ehrenfels cal ls an immediate va lue. 1 2 The value of the man he cai l s a constitulive value(compare the va l ue typology represented be)ow ) . An exampie of a mixed const i tu t i ve and effect va lue would be the value of a piece ofore i n v i rt u e of t hai pa rt üf it which is i ron , wh ich is i n turn valuedbeca use of the eff ects of its use in pa rt icular applica t ions. But notethat the piece of ore may also for example in reflec t ion of itsbeau ty -* have val ue for i t s own sake . Th is shows that even theposi t ion of ob3ects in the va ! ue typology is in part contextandsubject-dependent . One and the same object can i n one context havean in t rinsic value , in another merel y an cffect va!ue , and in another itmay have no value at all . ,Value /'/ ' ' / ........._____ / '-----. d. ,, me 1ate � / / \ '�, immediate pu rely / purely mixed '-., constitutive cau sal / � / \ ./ ' / ' / intrinsic effect values values (from p. 269 of System der Werttheorie. ) 1 1 . Menger's theory of capital divides effect values in turn into effectvalues of first order , which yield intrinsic value directly, effect va lues ofsecond order, which yield effect values of fi rst order, and so on. 1 2 . l t a ttaches to i t s object 'immediately ' in the sense of Husserl (Logicallnvestiga t ion I I I , § 1 8). 1 60 The const i tu t i ve va lue of a whole is simp ly the sum of the i m med i a te va l ues of the pa ns . The effect va l ue of a whole , i n con t ras l , i s norma l l y not si m p!y the s u m o f the va l ues o f t h e part s . (Cons ider the respec t i ve effect va l ues of two pa i rs of shoes , one a norma l pa i r , t h e o ther a pai r cons is t ing of two independent l y perhaps more va l ua ble - !eft shoes .) Th is non-summat ive character of effec t va l ues retlects what t he Austr ian econom i sts ca l led 'com- plemen t a r i t y ' a mongst materia l and other resou rces , and eh . VII of Pa rt I of System der Wert theorie , "On t he C'a lcu lat ion of Effec t Va l ue s" . i s i n essence an exposi t ion of the main out l i nes of the Au s t ri an economic theory of complernenta r i ty a nd of t he associa ted not ions of impu t a t ion and subst i t u t i on . Wi t h rega rd to t hese las t , bot h Me nge r a nd Ehren fe l s sha re the view tha t we assign effect va lues to ob_ject s to the ex t en t that we bel ieve in t ri n s ic va lues to be dependent upon the i r ex i stence (p . 3 1 ). (The proposi t i on tha t the va l ue of goods of h igher order i s dcri vcd sole ly from the va l ue of the consumer goods in whose rnan ufac tu re they serve has i ndeed come to be ca l l ed ' Menge r 's law' by present-day proponents of A ustrian econom ics . ) The prob lem of ' impu ta t ion' i s just t he problem of ca lcula t i ng effect val ues g i ven this dependence on in t rins i c va l ues . ( How, i n a complex p rocess of p rod uct ion of some consumer good , i s t he va l ue of the fac tors u sed i n th i s process to be irnpu ted from the va l u e for consumers of the expected end-product?) Cen t ra l to the econom i s t s ' sol u t ion to th i s problem , and also to Eh renfe l s ' account , i s the not ion of subst i t u tabi l i t y , the idea tha t the magn i t ude of an eff ec t va l ue i s t he cost of substi t u t i ng some o the r means of bringing about the same effect . The va l ue of the wa ter on board a sh ip i s the cost of a detour to rep len i sh stocks, and this changes, from day to day, with t he d i s ta nce from the nearest port . Effec t va l ues , for Eh renfe l s , d i vide into materia l goods on the one hand and h uman be i ngs (or more par t icu lar ly 'human act ions and qua l i t ies' ) on the o ther, The former he concei ves as the subject-mat ter of economics , t he la t ter fal l wi t h in the doma in of e th ics , though of course human beings, too, can be t reated as mate ria l goods , for ex�m�le when they a re used as s laves (p . 399) . But t h i s ifT)pl ies a reJec t 1on of the more usua l c lass ifications of the sciences of val ues : for now econom ics a nd e th ics , conceived a s sciences of effect value<; sta nd over aga i n s t , for e xa rn pl e , aest hetics, logic , med ic ine , hygiene : a nd other d i sc i pl i nes deal ing wi th i n t rins ic va lues : 1 6 1 Art , science , hea l th when these word s are understood i n a part icular way al l belong to that g rea t comple x of in t ri nsic va l ues which lend ex i s tence to effect va l ues not only i n the economic but a lso in the ethical sphe re (p .400). §7. What Doth Chari ty Avail Me? To solve the im putat ion problem , for example in order to decide whether to spend one's fort une on re l igious or on po l i t ica l pu rposes, or on somc m ix ture of bot h , or on wi ne , women, or song, i t is necessa ry that the i nd iv idual va l u i ng subject have some impl ic i t not ion of a common measure of the i n t ri ns ic va l ues wh ich might be yie lded by resources at h i s d i sposa l . Class ica l l y , the term 'u t i l i ty' has been ernp loyed for this concep t , but Eh renfels fi nds this term too na rrow. For someth ing i s norma l l y said to be of u t i l i t y for a subject on ly to the t: x tent tha t it l eads to a resu l t wh ich is of intri nsic va luefor him , i .e . of i n t ri ns ic va lue i n the narrow, egoistic sense : Thus , accord ing to common concept ions , t h e money wh ich I g i ve out for my own p leasure is of u t i l i t y : not , however . t ha t wh ich I g ive to the begga r wh ich g i ves him u t i l i t y ( p . 27 1 ) . In o rder to lea ve ' u t i l i ty ' wi t h i ts c us to rnary meaning we therefore i n t rod uce a s a techn ica l term the word ' ava i l ' (a trans lat ion of Eh ren fe l s ' somewhat a rcha i c 'Frommen ' ) . By 'ava ir i s rnean t , qu i t e genera l l y , t h e magni t udes of i ntr insic va lues underlying effect va lues , so that u t i l i t y then appears as a sub-c lass of ava i l . Courage in battle, d u teous service in one's pa rish , honour, chari ty , loyalty , marriage , honesty, may a l l be lack ing i n u t i l i t y for given i ndividuals i n given c i rcumstances ; but th i s does not mean that they a re without avail. Ehrenfe ls even goes so far as to formulate a ' law of d imin ishing margina l avai l ' (p . 274) , a nd in this he is , with Böhm-Bawerk , one of t he fi rst to recogn ise the possib i l i ty of genera l is ing the poin t of view of economic t heory in a way wh ich has now become a lmost commonplace to areas where it has h i t herto been held to be ent i re ly a l i en . 1 3 1 3 . Cf. Böhm-Bawerk , 1 88 1 , Becker , McKenzie and, for a genera l i n t rod uc t ion , McKenzie-Tu l lock . 1 6 2 § 8 . ln te rpe rsona l Yal ue-Compa risons A further prob lem for the genera l theory of va l ues i s that of compa ri ng or re l a t i ng the valuat ions of di fferen t i nd ividuals . One migh t , for e xample , reason that to affi rm tha t M places more value on object A than N , i s to affirm that M is ready to re l i nqu i sh more t han N for the rea l i sa t ion of A . Bu t then of course we have no means of compa ring t hei r respec t ive va l ua t ions of what i t i s t h a t each is prepared to sacrifice i n order to at ta in the desi red goal . In certain c i rcumsta nces we can appeal to some common sfandard . M migh t , fo r e xamp le , b e prepa red to sacrifice h i s l i fe and en t i re fortune for some gi ven end , where N is prepared to offe r no more than , say , an old ra incoa t . And because , i n t he case of va l ues such as l i fe , l iberty , hea l th , the l i fe of one 's fami l y and the l i ke , we can assume a fai r a mount o f un iform i ty across a normal populat ion , we can reasonably conc l ude in such c i rcums tances t ha t , o ther th i ngs be ing equal , M's va l ua t ion i s t he h i gher. Bu t a c lea r-c u t concl usion of th is sort wi l l be avai lab le on l y i n re l a t i vel y rare c i rcumstances . Ehrenfe l s t herefore considers a l so the possib i l i t y of effecting an independen t compa rison of d i fferen t subjects ' va l ua t ions by appeal to the i n tens i t ies of t he i r respect ive acts of fee l i ng and desire , that the t wo types of comparison ma y se rve as some sort of check on each othe r . ln tens i t ies of fee l i ng a nd desi re a re , after a l l , correlated , at l eas t to somc exten t , w i th phys io logical phenomena which can be measurcd . He notes, however , that the comparison of such absolute i n tensi t ies does not y ie ld a va l id measure for val ue-comparison : For suppose the two subjects M and N are of a completely identical psychica l d i sposi t io n , wi t h the si ngle e xception that al l feel ing reactions in M a re one and a half t imes more i n tens ive than i n N. In this case M and N would behave id ent ica l l y in all iden tica l si t uat ions; indeed one would have no means a t a l l , and no clue, as to how to ident ify the difference in the i r fee l i ng-react ions or even to presume that there i s such a d i fference . . . l f t wo subjects behave iden tica l l y in a l l conceivable cases o f conflict , then they a l so va lue ident ica l l y (p . 282f. ). In the comparison of the valuat ions of d i fferent subjects what matters is, t herefore , the direction and the relative intensit ies of the decisions of thei r wi l l and of the i r impulses to act ion , not the absolute i n tensi t ies of the i r feel i ng states . 1 63 §9 . Thc Struggle for Existence among Va lues Yalues a re , a s we havc see n , in every case relat ive to va lu ing subject s . and si nce there is compet i t ion amongst those subjects for va l ued objects of various types , so, deri va t ive ly , there arises a compet i t ion amongst values themselves . lt i s as if the ma terial of value were itself a scarce resource , and subject to a l l of the char- acte ri st ics of sca rce resources , i nc luding the l iabi l i ty to degenerate th rough overuse or to be used up. and to be aff ec ted e .g . by c l i mat ic or technological change or by growth i n knowledge . Ehrenfel s is aware that h i s account of thc mechanisms govern ing va lue-change may suggest certa in para l l e l s wi th the materia l i s t i n te rpretat ion of h i story. But the la t ter goes too fa r , he c la ims , in see ing the superstructura l d imension of val ue as be ing determ ined exhaust ive ly by u nderl ying ma teri al deve lopments . His accoun t , i n contrast , sees a comple x system o f dependence re la t ions between disposi t ions and tendencies on the two levels in such a way as to leave room for even large-sca le consequences of i ndividual acts , inc luding somet imes gra tu i tous acts of des ire . Cruc ia l to Ehrenfe ls ' account wh ich suggests a l so a comparison with Nietzsche is his bel ief that in trinsic va lues , too , may changc . Indeed Ehrenfel s cri t ic ises economics for concern ing itself with effect va lues �xc l us ively u nder cond i t ions of stable in trinsic va l ues (p . 3 33) . Change in i n t ri nsic va l ues i s brought about above a l l i n response to changes i n effect va lues , and then the new in t rinsic va l ues , i n ca l l ing forth new str i vi ngs on the part of h uman beings , transform the rela t ions of man to man, and therefore a l so transform for the va luing ind ividual the c i rcumstances of h i s su rrounding world , thereby setting in t ra in once more new mo1 ion in the effect val ues (loc.ci t . ) . Thus the i n tri nsic value which we , in Western countries , have late ly l ea rned to awa rd to 'se lf--deve lopment ' on the part of women , reflects changes for example i n the effect val ues of home services (brought about by technological deve lopments in the fields of cooking and c leaning). l t a lmest certa in ly refl ec ts a lso changes i n the effect val ues used up in generat ing 'se l f-deve lopment ' (as education , for example, has become cheaper, re lat i ve to other goods). It i s clear from all of this that there is no trace , i n Ehrenfels ' th ink ing , of value-absolut i sm or va lue-object ivism such as we find in , say , Plato, Meinong , Seheier, or N . Hartmann (or indeed , though 1 64 t hese a re pe rha ps to be ta ken less se riou s l y , i n certa i n protagonis ts of so-ca l l cd ' h uman righ t s ' ) . 1 4 Nor , e i t h er , i s there a trace o f e th i ca l formal i sm such a s we fi nd i n t h e 'meta ph ysical -myst ica l dogmat ism ' o f K a n t (p . 2 1 5 ): the princ iple of un i versa l i sab i l i t y Eh renfe l s would reject a s the resu l t of an insens i t i v i t y 10 t he wa ys i n wh ich even i n t ri n sic va l ues may d i ffer from i nd i v id ua l to i nd i vid ual accordi ng to age , sex , or persona l d i s pos i t ion , e . g . beca use of the d i ffe rent reperto i re of effec t va l ues wh ich each wi l l ha ve at h i s d i sposa l . Eh renfe l s ' a pproach to va l ues a lwa ys ma n i fes ts a tota l respect for the ka le id ic sh ift s i n the to ta l i t y of va l u e s , the motor of which he sees as a n e xt raord i na ri l y sub t le and complex systcm of the most manifold e ffcc t s a nd co unter-effect s , whe re 'one s tep d i s t u rbs a thousa nd lea ves ' ( p . 3 .B ) . Eh renfe l s ' views here a re not , howeve r , mere l y a form of soc i a l orga n ic i sm (a fasc i na t ion w i t h the b iomorphology of soc , e t y ) . The y a re , ra t h e r , thc resu l t of a theoret ica l rccogn i t i on of the 1 rn portance of the ma rg i na l pr i nc i p le --* of the pr i nc iple tha t you can have too m uch of a good t h i n g i n gove rn ing the movements of va l ue in a soc ie ty . Class ica l u t i l i t a ri an ism ignores this pr inc ip le in a ffi rm i ng , ll a t l y , tha t t he genera l u t i l i t y of g i ven fee l ing-d i sposi t i ons w i l l gua ra n tee thc i r h igh e t h ica l va l ue . For i t thereby fa i l s to accoun t for t he ca ses where , p rec i se l y a s a resu l t o f s u ch h igh va l ua t ion , a gi ven fee l i ng-<l ispos i t ion is rep l i ca ted to the e xtent where i t begi ns to ha ve nega t i ve conseq uences for the common good . For Eh renfe l s , i n con t ras t : On ly t hose d i sposi t i ons a re val ued h 1gh l y for wh ich an increase i n the fac t u a l l y e x i s t i ng s toc k would be such as t o promote the genera l good (p . 4 38 ) . On l y those fee l i ng-d ispos i t i ons a re va l ued h igh ly for wh ich the 1 4 . Va l ucs , for Eh renfe l s , e i ther exist or do not cx i s t : t hey cannot be t rue or fa l se . He does however recognise certa i n sorts of error of va/uation. The va l ue of q uack remedies , for exa rn ple . cornes in to be ing on ly t h rough the med i a t i on of a fa lse j udgrnen t about an object . He recogn ises a l so the poss ibi l i t y of ma k i ng a fal se j udgment about a va l ue , e . g . , when someone a ssumes , i ncorrec t ly , that he k nows wha t i s best for another . Cf. System der Werttheorie , Pa rt 1 , Ch . I X a nd Pa rt I I , Ch . VB . A fu l l t reatment of these ma tters would requi re a deta i led comparison of Eh renfels' views wi th those of Bren tano ( 1 889), for whom the role of (correct and i ncorrect)judgmenr i n t he t heory of va l ues is much more prom i nen t . . 1 • 1 6 5 demand i s grea tc r than the s upp ly , a nd a l a rge pa rt o f Ehrenfe l s ' e thics i s conce rncd w i th the soc ia l 'regu lators' which st im u late i nd i vidua l s to opt imal l eve ls of p roduct ion of feel i ngs such as gui l t , regret , compassion , caut ion , enthusiasm , and the l ike . § 10 . Va lue and Habi t Eh ren fe ls ' account of the evol u t i on of va lues rests on a d i st i nction between I . cultural development , i .e . t he accum ulat ion of products of ma ter ia l and i n t e l lect u a l l ahour , o r of cap i t a l in the widest sen se , inc luding acqui red h uman capi ta l , a n , la nguage , re l ig i on , l aw, trad i t ions of ch i ld -rea ri ng , e tc . , and 2 . cons ti t u t i ve de velopment , i . e . the evolu t ion of i nborn phys i ca l and psych ica l characteri s t ics of the organ i sm . 1 5 l t i s one pri nc i pa l theme of Eh renfe ls ' later wr i t i ngs that cu l tu ra l evo l u tion may have a nega t ive effect on const i tut i ve evol u- tion (cf. Grass l , 1 982a , pp. J 3ff. ) . l t i s not t hi s aspect of Ehrenfe ls ' t hought wh ich i s of i n te res t t o us he re , however, bu t ra ther the detai ls of the wavs i n wh ich , on h i s account , c u l t u ra l and const i tu t i ve fac to rs i n te ract � i th each other in 1he indi vidual subject. We shal l seek spec i fi ca l l y to a nswer the quest ion as to how the ind ivid ual can acq u i re or l earn to perce i ve cu l t u ra l va lues as va l ues at a l l . Before we ca n a n swcr t h i s q ue st i on , however, a nother de tour i s necessa ry , i n orde r tha t we may set forth the out l ines of a stra in of Herba rt i a n i sm i n Eh ren fe l s ' t h i nk ing . Herba rt concei ved the m ind as consist i ng , i n effect , of two lcve ls : a s t rict l y confined level of consciousness , and a deeper , sub-conscious leve l , wit h i n wh ich i t i s as i f there i s un l i rn i ted space and freedom of movemen t . 1 6 Elements a re excha nged cont i n uous l y between the t wo leve l s , thei r passage gov- erned by q uasi-mechan ical l aws of a t t ract ion and repulsion ( ' l aws of 1 5 . As wi l l become clear, there is much in Eh renfels' wri t i ngs to suggest t he fu rther d i s t inc t i on . cmphas i sed by Hayek ( 1979) , between l (a ) . cu l tural va l ues which a re the prod uct of del ibera te huma n c reation or design , for example the va lue of an e lec t ro-t u rb ine , a nd l (b) . cu l t u ral val ues which e xis t a s a resu l t of human act ion bu t a s i t s unintended consequences. Not everyth ing tha t is not n a t u ra l is therefore a lso 'a rtific ia l ' i n the normal sense of this word . 1 6. lt may be worth point ing out here that Herbart had a no less powerfu l influence on the th ink i ng of Freud. 1 66 associa t ion ' ) a nd subject to different sorts of forces a nd pressu res ( ' i n h ibi t i o n ' , 's uppression ' , e tc . ) . The deta i l s of Herbart 's v i ew need not , fortunate iy , concern us here . The version wh ich Eh renfe ls accepted was, i n a ny case, toned down by elements of the rather more soph is t icated act-psychology of Brentano . The fol lowing passage from the System der Werttheorie wi l i , however , gi ve a flavour of the view in quest ion: Jmmed i a te l y a fter we recei ve a vivid impressi on . the image of the lauer floats before us wi th grea t dari iy , a nd even i f i ! is for a t ime suppressed from our consciousness th rough subsequent experiences, s t i l l , i t reassert!'. i tsel f wi thout any exert ion on our pa rt a s soon as there is, so to speak , a free space somewhat as a submerged p iece of wood wi l l rise to t he su rface of wa ter as soon as one !eaves it to i tsel f (p . 34 1 f. ) 1 7 Let us assume, if only for the sake of argument , that there is at least somc g ra in of t ruth i n what Herbart , Ehrenfels ( and Freud) have to say i n t h is a nd si m i lar passages about tbe 'narrowness of conscious- ness' (Enge des Bewusstseins] . What is the relevance of th is notion to our presen t concerns? Act ions normal ly take pl ace only to the extent that t here a re assoc ia ted desi res (acts of s triv rng and wil l ing). But such des i res , together wi t h the presenta t ions which they i n voive and t he fee l i ngs w i th which they may be associated, take up ,pace, to the ex tent tha t t h e execut ion of even a relat ive ly unsoph ist icated system of act ions wou ld he imposs ib le if the presenta t ions and desires associated wi th each of i t s various component paits would have to remain in consciousness s imu ltaneously . The na rrowness of cons- ciousness wouid secm to imply that i t would be poss ible for man to form desires re la ting on!y to re!a t i ve !y simple tasks , ordercd at best in a l inear fashion, leav ing no scope for the nesti ng of cnds and means, for practice and rehearsal , for planning or preparation in advance . How, t hen , can thc somet i mes massively complica ted systems of higher order act ions characterist ic of l ife i n developed societ ies come about at a l l? l t w i l l no t suffice to seek a sol ut ion to this problem by point ing to wha t might be ca l led a division of the labour of desire i n society (though such certa in l y exists ) , for there are many h igher-order actions which involve one i nd ividual only, and even in cases of collect ive act ion the problem would rema i n of giving an account other than by an appea l to some k i nd of pre-establ i shed harmony of how the 1 7. The passage occurs in the context of a discussion of Herbart's t heory . 1 67 respecti ve des ires of the part ic ipat ing subjects should ret lculate wi th each other in just the wa ys which are necessary to yield the appropriate results . Ehrenfels' solution to th is problem consi sts in the idea that even com plex systems of h igher order act ions, as they man i fest themselves in the l ife of the ind ividual , a re broken down into const i tuen t , rela t i ve l y rout ine tasks, in such a way that the desi res necessary to call forth each part icu lar task i n the appropria1e context enter in to consciousness a utomatica l l y . Thi s comes about i n v i rtue of the fac t t hat the objects whose rea l isa t ion is t he goal of the g iven const i t uem micro-act ions have become , i n d iffe ren t wa ys, stamped with vai ue i n the i r own righ t . Or more precise l y , s ince for Eh renfels va lue is i tself just the reiat ion of desi rabi l i t y of an object for a subjec t , the subject h imse l f becomes affected in such a way that des i re for the rea l i sa t ion of the g iven 0bject ar i ses automatica l l y wi th in h i rn , w i thout h i s having to recai l or work ou t rat iona l l y in each succe.:;s ive i nstance why it is that he fi nds the g i ven obj ect va l uable . The mechanisms by which the subjcct is a ffected in the re levan t wa ys a re certain highly spec i fic fee l ing-di sposit iom, 'wh ich enab!e us to ca rry through a system of act ions once started with rela t ively l i t t l e expense of prescntat ional act i vi t y in our des iri ng' (p . 372). These a re portmantcau fee l i ng-dispos i t ions, eff ect 1ve , i n principle, in re lation to a l l sphe res of l i fe , d i sposi t ions wh ich we have just because we are norma ! i y deve loped act ing , desiring subjects . Tirns , a t least wi th in certain l im i t s . we possess a d isposi t ion to fee l more comfortable in doing what we have done before (the mechanism of habitualion ). We possess a d i sposi t ion to feel uneasiness at a n interruption of a system of act ions once in i tiated , or a t the giving up of a decision once made . 1 8 h is as a resu l t of these and related dispositions that objects which we have once conceived as means towards some desi red goa l thereby qu ick ly acqu i re the characterist ic of goods i n the ir own right . Tims w e are spa red the constant regard t o t h e end-resu l t o r u l t ima te goa l of our act ions , or indeed to any goal at all. In the course of the 1 8 . The paral le l suggests itse lf between these phenomena and the pheno- mena of t ime-preference and risk-aversion discussed by econom ists (and in particular by the members of t he Austrian school ) . All the given disposi tions occur to different degrees in different individuals , and in different types and classes of individua l . All can be affected by (and have an effect on the success of) education and training. 1 68 exccu t ion of the overwhe lming majority of our act ions we procecd mechanically. The s t uden t . for example , does not need to reca l l , as he buys h i s tra in t icke t a t t h e s ta t ion , that he is doi ng th i s because i t is necessa ry to reach the mounta in s ; he has a l ready q ua l i tied the t icket -* or the possession of lt -as a 'good ' in t he cons idera t ions which preceded his decision. And he desirt"s 1 h is good , now. for as long as the gi ven considera t ions a re not pu t ou t of ac t ion not a s mean s . but as end , jus t as he desires the v iew from t he moun l a i n s (p . 373). Where we imagine that a given system of act i ons is running its course i n a way which i m pl ies chat i t i s coord ina ted by a determ ined ego or se i f. characterised by resol u t ion a nd si ngle-mindedness , there i s i n fact a cont inuous and somewhat haphazard swicch ing of desi re from end-resu l t to med ia t e goa l , from presen t act ion to subsequent act i on . in terspe rsed , for the fa r grea ter part of the t ime (or i ndeed, i n ca scs of total rou t i n i sa t i on , usurped en t i re ly) , by per iods wi t hout any sort of des i re a t a l l . And wc can he reby perha ps beg:in to understand how i t i s poss i bie tha t the specific ma teria l d ispos i t ions appropna te to gi ven h igher order act ions shou ld become inscribed on the i nd i vid ual , and how the a ssocia ted systems of cu l t ura l va l ues shou!d come into be i ng and should thereafter be prese rved a nd respected . Consider , fo r cxam ple , t he complex networks of va l ues wh ich are i n vol ved i n t he respect we have for good manners , or for good grammar . or for legal or po l i t ica l or rel igious inst i tu t ions . or in our concern to go about our da i ly tasks i n an honest and d i l igen t fashion . lhe d i sposi t ions to fee l i ng which these va! ues reflect a re not . except in a vanish i ngl y sma l l degree , i nna te ; and nor a re they acqu i red as a resu l t of ra t ional i nsigh t on the part of mdividuals into the truth or fals i ty of given laws or ma xims . Ra ther , they are the cum ula t ive efTects of the workings of mechanisms of ha bituat ion , etc . , of the k i nd referred to above . 1 9 Of course , i n the vast majori ty of cases , t hese mechanisms are brought i n to pla y and the relevant d i sposi t ions t hereby become 19 . Many of t he ideas in th i s sect ion wi l l be found , in different fonns, in Hayek , 1 962, which rests in turn on Hayek , 1 952. They can be detected a l so in the t h i nk i ng of Hume, for whom of cou rse the not ion of habil p layed a cen t ra l role , not leas t in h i s concept i on of t he work ings of pol i t ical and rel igious inst i t u t ions . (See Ehrenfe l s , 1 8 8 7, pp . 5 54 , 576, ) • 1 69 inscr ibed on t he subject as a resul t of thc fact that a n ind ividua l is i n the fi rst place constra ined by another to execute a gi ven h igher order act ion against his will. Indi viduals acq u i re cu l t u re above all through t ra i n i ng and ed uca t ion . But to describe the complex i n terplay of va l ue and fee l ing which is at work i n th i s , necessari ly col lective or co l l a bora t i ve process, would lead us far too fa r afield . § 1 L Conc l us ion This b rief out l ine has . I ho*pe , b rought ou t three cent ra l features of Ehrenfe l s ' work on val ue theory : 1 . i ts nat u ra l i sm and descri pt i ve dept h : Eh renfel s makes no as- sumpt ion that need be rcgardcd a s implausible by any h u man science ; 2 . 1 t s appea l to struuure , to dependenc� rela t ions and ca usa l re!a t ions , above a l l i nvolvmg ac t s a nd d i spos i t ions t o ac t ;20 3 . i t s sensi t i v i t y to the rela t iona i charac ter of va ! ue s , which is man i fested in a wa y wh ich leaves room for a power on the part of ind iv iduals to determ inc va l ues wi t hout however co l laps ing i nto mere re la t i vism or scepticism , 20. Dcpendence rela t ions or relat ions of inseparabi l i ty hold ing across t ime are inadmissible w i th in the framework of Brentano's own descriptive psyrhology , which is in th is respect in ferior to that of Eh renfels : sec the cr i t ica l rema rks appended to Mu l ! igan/Sm i t h , 1 985 . Bib l iography Anscombe , G.E . M . ! 978 "Wi l l and Emotion" , i n R .M.Chisholm and R . Ha l ler, eds . , Die Philosophie Pranz Brentanos, Amsterdam : Rodopi (Gra- zer Philosophische Studien , 5 ) , 1 39-48. Becker, G . S. 1 976 The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago and London: University of Ch icago Press. Böhm�Bawerk , E. von 1 88 1 Rechte und Verhältnisse vom Standpunkt der volkswirtschaftlichen Güter/ehre , Vienna : Wagner'schen Universitätsbuch- handlung; Eng . trans. as: "Whether Legal Righ ts and Relat ionshi ps a re Economic Goods", in Shorter Classics of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk , South Holland: Libertarian Press, vol . I , 301 38 , 1 962. Brentano , F. 1 874 Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt , vol . I , I st ed . , Lei pzig : Duncker and H umblot ; Eng . t rans . of 2nd ed . , Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , London : Rout l edge, 1 973 . 1 70 1 889 Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Lei pzig: Duncker and Humblot ; Eng. trans„ The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong , London : Routledge , 1 969. Duncker, K. 1 94 1 "On Pleasure , Em otion and Stri ving' ' , Phi/osophy and Phenomenologica/ Research , 1 , 39 1 -430. Eaton. H. 0. 1 930 The Austrian Philosophy of Va/ue , Norman: Univers i ty of Oklahoma Press . Eh renfels , C von 1 887 ' 'Über Fühlen und Wol ien . Eine psychologische Studie" , Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (phil. -hist. Klasse} , l 1 4 , 523-636. l 890 " Über 'Gestai tqual i täten "', Vierteljahrsschrtfr jür wissenschaftliche Philosophie , 1 4 , 242-92; Eng. trans. in Smith , ed . , ( in preparation). 1 893/94 " Werttheorie und Eth i k " , Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaft- liche Philosophie . 1 7 . 761 10 , 200-266, 3 2 1 -63 , 4 1 3-75 ; 1 8 , 77-97 ; repr. in Eh renfels , 1 982 . 1 897 System da Weruheorie, vol . I , A llgemeine Werttheorie. Psychologie des Begehrens, Lei pzig: Rei s land . 1 898 Sy�tem der Wert theorie , vol . I I , Grundzüge einer Ethik , Lei pzig: Reisland; bo1h vols . re pr . i n Ehrenfe ls , 1 982 . 1 9 1 6 " l-l öhe und Rei nhe i t der Gesta l t" , from Kosmogonie , Jena : Die- derichs , pp .93-96, repr . in F. Weinhand! , ed . , Gestalthaftes Sehen, Darm- stad t : Wi sse nschaft l i che Buchgese l lscha ft . 4-46; Eng . t rans. in Sm i th , ed. , ( in prepara t ion 1 . 1982 Philosophische Schr{/ten. vol . I , Werttheorie , ed . R . Fabian , Mur. ich : Ph iiosophia . Fabian, R . a nd Simons, P . M . 1 985 "The Second Austrian School of Va lue Theory", in Smith and Grassl , eds . Grass l , W. 1 98 1 "Grenznutzen lehre und Eth i k ". i n E. Morscher and R . Stran- zinger. eds. , Ethik. Grundlagen, Probleme und Anwendungen. Proceedings of t he 5th I nternat i onal Wi ttgenste in Sympos iu m , Ki rchberg am Wechsel , 1 980, Vienna : Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 2 1 9-22. 1 982 " La mora le come mercato: u ti l i t a rismo e marginal i smo nel la fi losofia mora le d i Mar io Ca lderoni " , in R . Faucc i , ed . , Gli italiani e Ben rham. Dal/a "felici ta pubblica" alt economia de/ benessere , Roma : Franco Ange l i , vol . I I , 29-4 1 . 1 982a "Ch rist ian von Ehrenfels a ls Werttheore t iker", i n Ehrenfels , 1 982, 1 -22. 1985 "Markets and Moarl ity . Austrian Perspektives on the Economic Approach to Human Behaviour", in Smith and Grass ! , eds . - (forthcoming) ' 'Et i ca ed economia . La matrice aust riaca de l pensiero di Mario Calderoni ", Giornale critico dellaftlosofia italiana. Haye k , F.A. 1952 The Sensory Order. An lnquiry in to the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology, London : Routledge. • • 1 7 1 1962 "Ru les , Pe rception and ! n te l l igibi l i t y" , Proceedings of the Brilish Academy, 48, repr . in Studie s in Phi!osophy, Politics and Economics . London: Rout ledge , 1 967, pp .43-65 . 1 979 "The Three Sources of Human Val ues", i n /Aw, L:1gis/a1ion and Liberty , vol . 3, Londo n : Routledge , 1 531 76. Inga rden, R . 1 984 1\-lan and rtalue , Munich : Phi losophia . Kirzner, I .M. 1 973 Competi!ion and Entrepreneurship, Chicago: Univcrsity of Ch icago Press . 1 979 Perception, Opportunity and Profit: Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship , Ch icago: Univcrsi t y of Chicago Press . Kraus , 0. 1 90 1 Zur 17ieorie des Wertes. Eine Bentham-Swdie . Hal l e : N iemeyer . 1937 Die Werttheorien. Geschichte und Kritik , Bn,inn : Rohrer. Kreibig. J .C. 1 902 Psychoiogische Grundlegung eines Systems der Wert- Theorie . Wien : Holder . McKenzie , R. B. 1 977 "The Economic Dimensions of Ethica l Behavior", Ethics, 87, 208-2 1 . and Tulloc k , G . 1 978 The New World of Economics , Homewood: I rwin . Meinong. A . von 1 894 Psychoiogisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth- theorie , G raz: Leuschner a nd Lubensk y . Menger , C. 1 87 1 Grundsätze der Volkswirtschafts/ehre, Vienna : Braum üller; Eng. t rans . as Principles of Economics , Glencoe , I I I . : Free Press, 1950. M ul l igan , K. and Smit h , B. 1 98 5 " Fran7 Brentano's Ontology of Mind . A C'rit ical Study of the Deskriptive Psychologie", Philosophy and Phenomenologica/ Research. 45. Nozick , R . 1 974 Anarchy. Stare and Utopia , New York : Basic Books . 1 98 1 Philosophicai Explanations, Oxford : Oxford Universi ly Press. Smi th , 8 . 1 985 "A ustrian Economics and Austrian Ph i losophy " , in Smith and G rass ! , eds. Smith , B . , ed . 1985 Foundations of Gestalt Theory, Munich : Philosophia. Srnith , B . and Grass! , W., eds . 1 986 A ustrian Economics. Historical and Philosophical Background, Beckenharn: Croom Helm .